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INTRODUCTION

URING the Survey period, courts decided a number of interest-

ing cases that shed new light on Texas partnership and limited
liability company law. For example, courts considered the instances in which partners have fiduciary duties and, when they do, the
extent of such fiduciary duties. The courts also considered which actions
or inactions constitute a breach of such fiduciary duties. Further, the
courts dealt with recent changes in the Texas Business Organization Code
involving liability of partners in partnerships and members in limited liability companies. Also during the Survey period, courts analyzed the standard necessary to bring a derivative claim on behalf of a partnership
against a partner. Generally, the decisions this Survey period emphasized
the need to carefully draft court documents and to comply with civil procedure rules when bringing claims. Additionally, the courts' willingness to
give great weight to the terms set forth in partnership and LLC agreements underscores the importance of careful negotiation and drafting of
* Partner at Haynes & Boone, LLP; B.A., Baylor University (with honors); M.A.,
University of Oklahoma; J.D., Baylor University School of Law (cum laude).
** Partner at Haynes & Boone, LLP; B.A., Vanderbilt University; J.D., University of
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*** Associate at Haynes & Boone, LLP; B.S., Saint Louis University (summa cum
laude); J.D., Southern Methodist University (summa cum laude).
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these types of agreements. This Article is divided into four main Sections
that explore recent decisions encompassing the following topics: (II) fiduciary duties, (III) veil piercing, (IV) derivative claims, and (V) limited
liability of partners in limited liability partnerships.
II. FIDUCIARY DUTIES

A.

BROWN v. KEEL

The First Court of Appeals rendered an opinion that provides guidance
on the scope of fiduciary duties that one partner owes to another.' The
court focused on the need for a complaining party to demonstrate that a
breach proximately caused the claimed damages in order to recover. 2 In
2004, R. Scott Brown and Allan Keel discussed an investment opportunity involving oil and gas funds with GulfWest Energy (GulfWest), a
Houston-based oil and gas company.3 Brown and Keel formed a limited
liability company, Volant, and they sent GulfWest an acquisition proposal.4 Brown and Keel realized that they needed investors, and Keel consequently sought out Oaktree Capital Management (Oaktree), a California
private investment fund, to fill this role.5 Keel sent Oaktree a term sheet
that proposed that Oaktree provide the necessary funding to buy out
GulfWest completely, thereby converting it from a public to a private
company. 6 The term sheet also proposed that Keel and Brown would stay
on as management-with Keel as CEO and Brown as CFO-and that
Keel and Brown would provide $300,000 in initial funding, receive fiveyear employment contracts, and receive a 1% transaction fee, as well as
equity options.7
Oaktree rejected the proposal, and it decided instead to invest only
half of the proposed investment to own a majority stake in GulfWest.8
Oaktree opted to make the investment itself, rather than to use Keel and
Brown's company, Volant, and Oaktree changed the terms Brown and
Keel had initially proposed to terms much less favorable to them. 9
During the negotiations, discord developed between Brown and Oaktree's key negotiator, Skardon Baker.10 In January 2005, Baker notified
Keel that Oaktree no longer had intentions of hiring Brown as CFO and
that the company questioned Brown's ability to fill the role." Keel did
not disclose this conversation to Brown; instead, on the following day, he
1. See Brown v. Keel, No. 01-10-00936-CV, 2012 WL 760933, at *8-11 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).
2. Id. at *9.
3. Id. at *1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *2.
11. Id.
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allowed Brown to loan money to GulfWest, whose liquidity problems had
become severe enough to interfere with the transaction. 12 Throughout
January, Keel failed to notify Brown of Oaktree's intentions, but he did
send an email to Oaktree's management that encouraged them to pay
Brown what he was due and also shared his confidence in Brown's abilities to act as a competent CFO.13 Later in January, Oaktree informed
Brown that there would not be a place for him as CFO, but it opened
discussions about another role for him. 14 Keel, on the other hand, rejected the idea of placing Brown in any other role.1 5 In February, Keel
notified Brown that there would be no place for him to work within the
company. 16
The deal between Oaktree and GulfWest closed the same month, February 2005, and Brown then brought suit.17 He alleged that Keel had
breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Brown by not disclosing his discussions with Oaktree about Brown's position and by discouraging Oaktree from hiring Brown in a capacity other than CFO.18 At trial, the jury
awarded Brown damages of $1.25 million, based on the value of the stock
options as of February 2005, which a successful transaction would have
given Brown. 19 In response, Keel moved for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict (JNOV), which the court granted. 20 The court entered a takenothing judgment in favor of Keel, reasoning that no partnership was created and that there was no proximate causation. 21
On appeal, the court of appeals overruled the JNOV with respect to
the partnership formation issue and held that a partnership was indeed
formed between Brown and Keel. 22 In making this determination, the
court analyzed the following factors: (1) whether Brown and Keel had
rights to share profits of the business; (2) whether Brown and Keel intended to be partners; (3) whether Brown and Keel had rights to participate in the control of the business; (4) whether Brown and Keel agreed to
share losses of the business and liabilities arising from the business; and
(5) whether Brown and Keel contributed or agreed to contribute money
to the business. 2 3 Although Brown did not have to prove the existence of
every one of these factors, the court found that there was enough evidence to prove the existence of each factor. 24
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

*3.

*3-4.
*8.
*4.
*5-8.
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On the other hand, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's finding
on the causation issue and held that there was no evidence to support a
finding that Keel's breach of his fiduciary duty proximately caused
Brown's injuries. 25 The court noted that Brown had the burden to present
evidence that: (1) "but for" Keel's breach, the transaction would have
given Brown stock options; (2) Keel's breach was a significant reason for
Brown's failure to receive the stock options; and (3) it was foreseeable
that the breach would cause Brown's loss of the stock options. 26
The court of appeals noted that even though Keel's actions may have
precluded Brown from receiving an alternative management position
within the company, there was no evidence that he would have received
stock options if he had been hired for another position. 27 The court reasoned that Keel's actions did not cause Brown to lose something of value
because Brown was seeking damages for a loss of stock options-not a
loss of salary for a new position-and Keel produced evidence that Oaktree had devoted all of its available stock options to other members of the
team. 28
Brown argued that Oaktree could have offered him stock options in
the form of warrants, even if they decided not to hire him.29 In response
to this argument, the court of appeals held that Keel's conduct had nothing to do with Oaktree's decision not to give Brown these stock options
and that there was no evidence that Oaktree ever even considered this
option.30 As a result, even though Keel's actions breached the fiduciary
duties that he owed to his partner, Keel was not liable because Brown
could not prove that Keel's breach proximately caused his damages. 3 1
Justice Sharp presented an interesting dissent on the issue of causation. 32 Justice Sharp reiterated the standard for a JNOV, reminding the
court of appeals that it should not overturn the jury's finding of causation
"[a]s long as a reasonable jury could infer that Keel's actions were a substantial factor in having brought about Brown's injury."3 3 Justice Sharp
looked at Brown's injury more broadly by describing Brown's damages as
the loss of his whole compensation package, rather than merely as the
loss of potential stock options. 34 Justice Sharp pointed out that when
Oaktree notified Brown that he would not be offered a position as
GulfWest's CFO, Oaktree still expressed interest in allowing Brown to
serve in another management capacity, which would have come with a
compensation package.3 5 Keel, at least to some degree, prevented this
25. Id. at *11.

26. Id. at *9.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Sharp, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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from happening when he told Oaktree that he did not feel that Brown
would be a good fit for another position within the company. 36 This alone
was enough, in Justice Sharp's opinion, to demonstrate a basis for a reasonable jury to infer that Keel's actions were a substantial factor in bringing about Brown's injury.3 7
This case is particularly thought-provoking because the justices reached
very different outcomes based almost solely on how broadly they defined
Brown's injury. On the face of the facts, it seems clear that Keel acted in
a manner that was an obvious breach of his duty of loyalty to his partner.
Although he had knowledge for over a month that the company did not
want to place Brown in a CFO position, he failed to notify Brown. To
make matters worse, Keel even allowed Brown to loan his personal
money to GulfWest in order to keep the transaction alive after he was
aware of Oaktree's position. In addition to these breaches of loyalty
through omission and inaction, Keel then proactively committed a breach
by commission when he recommended that the company not place
Brown in any other position. Given the somewhat egregious course of
action that Keel took against his partner, it seems as though the court of
appeals split hairs to conclude that although Keel breached his fiduciary
duties, he did not proximately cause a loss of stock options specifically.
As Justice Sharp pointed out, a JNOV requires a very high standard to
overturn a jury's verdict, and the facts here provide enough evidence for
a reasonable jury to find that Keel's actions precluded Brown from receiving adequate compensation, which include these stock options.
This case highlights the importance of procedure and the careful drafting of all court documents, a recurring theme throughout this Survey period. If Brown simply had pleaded his damages more generally by, for
example, arguing that he had lost money, rather than specifically arguing
that he had lost stock options, the majority would have likely reached a
different conclusion.
B.

DA

iEL.s v. EmPTY EYE, INC.

In another court of appeals case from Houston, this time from the
Fourteenth District, the court explored the scope of fiduciary duties owed
by partners in a partnership, specifically addressing the fiduciary duties
that a limited partner owes to a limited partnership.38 Although limited
partners do not necessarily owe any formal fiduciary duties to the limited
partnership,39 this case illustrates that a limited partner may owe such
duties if the court finds the existence of an informal fiduciary relation36. Id.
37. Id. at *12.
38. Daniels v. Empty Eye, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 743, 746-47 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
39. See id. at 759 (Frost, J., dissenting); see also AON Props., Inc. v. Riveraine Corp.,
No. 14-96-00229-CV, 1999 WL 12739, at *23 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 14,
1999, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding no authority in Texas that imposes fiduciary duties on a
limited partner).
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ship, usually by demonstrating that there is a relationship of trust and
confidence between the limited partner and the partnership. 40
The dispute at issue involved a series of personal and professional relationships. In 1997, Jiles Daniels married Judith Daniels. 41In 2000, the two
formed Empty Eye, Inc. (the Corporation). 42 Later that year, Jiles,
Judith, and the Corporation formed Empty Eye & Associates, L.P. (the
Limited Partnership). 43 The Corporation served as the general partner
and 1%owner of the Limited Partnership, and Jiles and Judith served as
limited partners and 99% owners. 44 In 2005, the Limited Partnership purchased land to begin a project to build an apartment complex. 45 To finance the project, the Limited Partnership arranged for construction
financing from Independence Bank. 46 Under the financing agreement,
the bank required Jiles and Judith to each sign a personal guaranty of the
Limited Partnership's indebtedness to the bank, but the contract's terms
allowed the guaranty to be revoked at any time before the bank distributed any funds. 47
Sometime in 2006, Jiles and Judith began having marital difficulties,
and Jiles filed for divorce in December 2006.48 Jiles then rescinded his
personal guaranty on the loan from Independence Bank.49 No funds had
been advanced for the construction yet, and the bank subsequently rescinded the construction loan.50 Jiles informed various contractors that he
did not authorize any work on the project, and he informed at least one
contractor that the bank had rescinded the construction loan. 5 '
In January 2008, the Limited Partnership, Judith, and the Corporation
brought an action against Jiles for breach of fiduciary duty.52 They argued
that Jiles had put his own interests above that of the Limited Partnership
by rescinding his personal guaranty-with knowledge that the actions
would ruin the Limited Partnership-in order to protect himself from
personal liability.53 The jury found that there was enough evidence to
support this assertion, and it concluded that Jiles's actions breached his
fiduciary duties to the Limited Partnership. 54
Jiles appealed the jury's finding, contending that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove that he owed a fiduciary duty.55 The court of
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See Daniels, 368 S.W.3d at 750.
Id. at 747.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 748.

2013]1

PartnershipLaw

1039

appeals explained that "[a] 'fiduciary' is a 'person who occupies a position
of peculiar confidence towards another"' and that "[a]n informal fiduciary relationship, also known as a 'confidential relationship,' may arise
'where one person trusts in and relies upon another, whether the relation
is a moral, social, domestic[,] or merely personal one." 56 The court clarified that in the instance of a business transaction, the special relationship
of trust and confidence must exist prior to the commencement of the business transaction.5 7
The jury charge at the trial stated:
A relationship of trust and confidence existed if Plaintiff justifiably
placed trust and confidence in Jiles Daniels to act in its best interest.
Plaintiff's subjective trust and feelings alone do not justify transforming arm's-length dealings into a relationship of trust and confidence.
You are instructed that a limited partner does not owe a fiduciary
duty to the limited partnership or another limited partner simply because of his status as a limited partner.58
The court held that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support
the jury's finding that a relationship of trust and confidence existed between Jiles and the Limited Partnership.59 As support for its conclusion,
the court noted that Jiles owed a fiduciary duty to each other partner of
the Limited Partnership: he had a duty to the Corporation because he
was a corporate officer, and he had a duty to Judith because they were
married. 60 The court pointed to Jiles's involvement in developing the
Limited Partnership's business plan and the fact that Judith trusted him
as a business partner to support its finding that they both placed trust and
confidence in Jiles, which gave rise to a confidential relationship and, as a
result, an informal fiduciary relationship. 61 The court of appeals also emphasized the fact that Jiles and Judith used the Limited Partnership to
manage real estate for rental purposes and to help build their own
home. 62 Even though Jiles and Judith were merely limited partners in the
partnership, they took on the responsibility for the partnership's debt
when they signed personal guaranties. 63 The court of appeals held that
these facts provided legally sufficient evidence to support the finding that
the Limited Partnership justifiably had a relationship of trust and confidence with Jiles, and, therefore, that an informal fiduciary relationship
existed. 64 As a result, the court upheld the portion of the award for Jiles's
56. Id. at 749 (quoting Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160 S.W.2d 509,
512 (Tex. 1942) and Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d
591, 594 (Tex. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 750.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 750-51.
62. Id. at 750.
63. Id. at 750-57.
64. Id. at 751.
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breach of fiduciary duty. 6 5
In response, Justice Frost contributed a vigorous dissent on the issue,
lamenting that "for the first time in the history of Texas jurisprudence,
evidence is held legally sufficient to support the imposition of an informal
fiduciary duty on a limited partner to place the interests of the limited
partnership before his own interests." 6 6 Justice Frost pointed out that informal fiduciary duties can arise from relationships involving trust and
confidence that would normally not give rise to a formal fiduciary duty
but that Texas courts are very reluctant to find such relationships. 67 In
fact, courts had previously held that "[n]ot every relationship involving a
high degree of trust and confidence rises to the stature of a fiduciary relationship." 68 Justice Frost took issue with the majority's argument that the
existence of Jiles's formal fiduciary duties to Judith and the Corporation
supported a finding that a relationship of trust and confidence existed,
giving rise to an informal fiduciary duty to the Limited Partnership-to
whom no formal fiduciary duty was otherwise owed. 69
Instead, Justice Frost argued, "[a] fiduciary relationship must stand on
its own." 70 Justice Frost criticized the majority for imputing a fiduciary
relationship between Jiles and the Limited Partnership merely on a showing that fiduciary relationships existed between Jiles and Judith and between Jiles and the Corporation.71 Since the record showed no reason to
disregard the separate legal status of these entities, the majority, according to Justice Frost, should not have relied on Jiles's other relationships to
determine his relationship with the Limited Partnership. 72 Jiles's mere
status as a limited partner of the Limited Partnership alone does not give
rise to a relationship of trust and confidence so as to establish an informal
fiduciary duty.73 Justice Frost argued that because Jiles did not hold an
officer position or maintain a marital relationship with the Limited Partnership, the formal fiduciary duties that may have existed between himself and Judith and between himself and the Corporation were not
relevant to the determination of Jiles's relationship to the Limited
Partnership. 74
Justice Frost made convincing arguments, and if nothing else, her dissent demonstrates the importance of this case: it underscores the newfound ease with which Texas courts might be willing to find an informal
fiduciary relationship, thereby imposing the fiduciary burdens that accompany such fiduciary relationships between limited partners and limited partnerships. This case also raises the question of whether the mere
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

755-56 (Frost, J., dissenting).
756.
757.

759.
758.
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act of signing personal guaranties on partnership loans might expose limited partners to a greater risk of fiduciary duty liability.
C.

STREBEL V. WIMBERLY

The First Court of Appeals, in Strebel v. Wimberly, addressed the scope
of fiduciary duties that members owe to an LLC and that partners owe to
a partnership, and the case provides insight on how courts will interpret
contracts when the scope of fiduciary duties that a partner or member
owes is at issue.7 5 In this case, John Wimberly and Douglas Strebel were
members of a limited liability company, Black River Capital, LLC (Black
River LLC), and each held a 50% membership interest. 76 Strebel solicited business from his friend, John Wilder, who had recently assumed the
role of TXU Energy CEO.77 Because the work stemmed from Strebel's
contact with Wilder, Wimberly and Strebel orally agreed to share their
profits-60% to Strebel and 40% to Wimberly.7 8
As the business expanded, Wimberly and Strebel decided to negotiate
an amended Black River LLC agreement to memorialize their discussion.79 In December 2005, the members executed the amended Black
River LLC agreement.8 0 The agreement kept the profit-sharing ratios the
same and specified that even though Strebel was managing manager, he
would not have the authority to make major decisions-including
"changing any Member's Sharing Ratio, requesting additional Capital
Contributions, and making Fundamental Changes in the Company"without consulting the Board of Managers.8 1 Wimberly, Strebel, Wimberly's wife, and Strebel's wife were all managers of the LLC, and they
comprised the Board of Managers. 82 The agreement also specified that
the managers owed fiduciary duties to the company and its members
commensurate with the fiduciary duties that directors owe Delaware corporations.8 3 It further stated that the members owed fiduciary duties to
the company comparable to those duties that Delaware corporations owe
their stockholders. 84
On the same day, Wimberly, Strebel, and two others entered into a
limited partnership agreement for Black River Capital Partners, LP
(Black River LP).85 That agreement established Black River LLC as the
general partner, with broad power to control Black River LP.8 6 The
75. See Strebel v. Wimberly, 371 S.W.3d 267, 276-86 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2012, pet. filed).
76. Id. at 270.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 271.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Black River LP agreement limited the general partner's "duties (including fiduciary duties)" to those "expressly set forth in th[e] [a]greement." 87
The agreement did not impose any other fiduciary duties on the general
partner.88
In November 2006, Strebel notified Wimberly that Wimberly's sharing
ratio in Black River LP would be reduced significantly. 89 Because Strebel
was managing manager of Black River LLC-the general partner of
Black River LP-and owned the majority of limited partner voting rights
in Black River LP, he held the authority to unilaterally amend the Black
River LP agreement to retroactively reduce Wimberly's share as of August 2006.90 In January 2007, Wimberly complained about Strebel's actions and his failure to consult with the Board of Managers of Black
River LLC before amending the Black River LP agreement. 9 ' In September 2009, the parties presented their case to a jury, and Wimberly accused
Strebel of breaching fiduciary duties by retroactively decreasing his distribution percentages and moving funds from profits to bonuses in order to
decrease Wimberly's share of distributions. 92 The jury held in Wimberly's
favor, but Strebel appealed.93
The court of appeals offered a detailed analysis of the scope of
Strebel's fiduciary duties. First, the court analyzed the Black River LLC
agreement to look for clues about the scope of fiduciary duties that
Strebel owed to Wimberly as a fellow member in the LLC. 94 Delaware
law governed the LLC agreement, and the court explained that the terms
of the agreement were the best source to determine the existence and
scope of any fiduciary duties that the manager might owe. 9 5 Since the
agreement stated that "[m]anagers shall have fiduciary duties to the Company and the Members equivalent to the fiduciary duties of directors of
Delaware corporations," the court concluded that it should measure
Strebel against that standard. 96
The court explained that the Supreme Court of Delaware has held that
directors of Delaware corporations owe duties of good faith, due care,
and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders. 97 Strebel tried to argue that the LLC agreement's language referring to duties owed to members meant duties owed as a whole to all members, rather than to one
particular member.98 The court did not find this argument convincing and
instead stated its preference to read contracts as a whole, giving terms
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 272.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 276-78.
Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 277-78.
Id. at 277.
Id.
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their plain and ordinary meaning.99 If the court interpreted the contract
language in accordance with Strebel's interpretation, the court pointed
out, it would essentially render a portion of the contract language meaningless. 00 The court reasoned that because the contract imposed fiduciary duties to the company and its members, Strebel's interpretation
negated the obvious meaning of the contract. 101
The court ultimately decided that it should determine the applicable
fiduciary duties for Strebel at the Black River LP level, since Strebel's
actions to retroactively reduce Wimberly's sharing ratio took place as a
decision made by the partnership. 02 As a result, the court analyzed
Strebel's fiduciary duties based on the Black River LP agreement.103 The
court held for Strebel on the fiduciary duties issue. 104 It explained that
because Strebel's actions were in his capacity as managing manager of the
partnership's general partner, the scope of Strebel's fiduciary duties
turned on the fiduciary duties that the general partner owed to the partnership.105 The court analyzed the contractual language of the Black
River LP agreement regarding fiduciary duties, and it pointed out that
the agreement expressly disclaimed the general partner's fiduciary duties
and consequently foreclosed Wimberly's ability to recover on a breach of
fiduciary duty claim against Strebel in his capacity as managing manager
of the general partner.106 The decision also addressed Strebel's potential
fiduciary duties to Wimberly in his capacity as a fellow limited partner in
the Partnership, but the court pointed out that, generally, limited partners
do not owe fiduciary duties to other limited partners, except in special
instances that did not apply in this case.107 Therefore, Strebel avoided any
potential liability based on his capacity as a limited partner as well.108
Although the court's conclusion ended up being relatively straightforward and based mostly on contract interpretation, the opinion holds
value because it contains a lively discussion of the fiduciary duties that
members and partners generally owe in the absence of contract language
to the contrary. Additionally, it examines how courts are likely to construe contract language regarding fiduciary relationships when conflicts
arise. The case showcases the court's general willingness to place significant weight on the contract's language because the terms are a reflection
of the parties' negotiation. Furthermore, it stresses the importance of negotiating a well-drafted partnership agreement that reflects the parties'
intent at the forefront. In this case, if Wimberly had negotiated that any
amendments to the partnership agreement-including changing sharing
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 278-82.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 283-85.
Id. at 284-85.
See id. at 280-81
Id. at 281.
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ratios-would require his consent, he could have avoided this resulting
litigation and, ultimately, defeat.
III. VEIL PIERCING
A.

SHooK v. WALDEN

In Shook v. Walden, the Third Court of Appeals in Austin examined
the recent state of the law regarding veil piercing in the context of limited
liability companies.109 Since the case arose before the enactment of the
new LLC provision governing veil piercing in the Texas Business Organizations Code (TBOC), the court of appeals had to determine how to apply veil piercing law in the context of an LLC without statutory
guidance. 1 10 The court interpreted the issue using corporate veil piercing
laws in a manner that happens to be consistent with the newly enacted
LLC statute governing veil piercing."1
In September 2006, Terry and Joy Walden entered into a pair of contracts with S & J Endeavors, LLC (S & J), a homebuilding and real estate
development company, that involved a real property sale and a home
construction project.112 The first contract related to the sale of a plot of
residential land (the Land Contract), and the second contract involved S
& J's commitment to build a residence for the Waldens on the soon-to-be
purchased plot of land (the Construction Contract).113
S & J had two members, Patrick Jaehne and Stanley Shook.114 Jaehne
controlled most of the day-to-day operations of the company, and he negotiated both the Land Contract and the Construction Contract with the
Waldens.11 5 Although Shook played some role in the company, he contended that his role was mainly limited to that of a passive investor.11 6 He
claimed that he had only invested because Jaehne had recently married
his daughter, and he wanted to assist Jaehne in obtaining the company to
ensure that Jaehne could support her.117
Immediately after signing the contracts in September 2006, the
Waldens paid $62,000, and construction on the house began." 8 Shortly
thereafter, a host of problems between the Waldens and S & J began.
First, the Waldens were displeased with the quality of work in the construction of their home and complained about various defects and
changes in the plan.119 Second, S & J failed to promptly transfer title to
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Shook v. Walden, 368 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. App.-Austin 2012, pet. denied).
See id.
See TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.002 (West 2012).
Shook, 368 S.W.3d at 607.
Id.
Id. at 608.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the Waldens.120 The delay occurred because, even though S & J purportedly sold the land to the Waldens, the title was actually wholly owned by
Jaehne in his individual capacity. 121 Jaehne had fallen behind on his personal debt obligations on the property, which inhibited his ability to
transfer clear title to the Waldens.12 2 Jaehne eventually transferred title
to the Waldens, but it was more than one year after the contemplated
completion date and with a vendor's lien attached. 123 In response, the
Waldens filed suit. 1 2 4 The jury determined that Shook was personally liable for S & J's contracts based on theories of both alter ego and sham. 125
Shook appealed the jury's finding, alleging that the Waldens also needed
to prove that he had engaged in actual fraud and had failed to do so.1 2 6
In addressing Shook's arguments, the court engaged in an in-depth
analysis of the current state of the law on corporate veil piercing in LLC
cases. The court explained that in response to the Castleberry decision,
which greatly increased the scope of personal liability for corporate
shareholders and directors, the legislature amended article 2.21 of the
Texas Business Corporation Act to limit judicial application of corporate
veil piercing principles. 127 One limitation prohibited courts from imposing corporate contractual obligations directly on shareholders
on the basis of actual or constructive fraud, or a sham to perpetrate a
fraud" except on proof that the shareholder had "caused the corporation to be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate
an actual fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit" of the shareholder.128
While Texas corporate veil piercing law was evolving, the first LLC
statutes were created. 129 In 1991, Texas enacted the first Texas Limited
Liability Company Act (LLC Act), which was later recodified as Title III
of the TBOC. 1 3 0 The court recognized that since S & J was formed before
the LLC Act's recodification, it had to analyze the case under the former
LLC Act laws. 131 The relevant portion of the LLC Act, article 4.03, stated
that "'[e]xcept as and to the extent the regulations [of the LLC] specifically provide otherwise, a member or manager is not liable for the debts,
obligations[,] or liabilities of a limited liability
company including under a
32
judgment decree, or order of a court."1
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 609.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 610.
126. Id. at 611.
127. Id. at 612.
128. Id. (quoting Act of May 12, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 217, § 1, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws
974, 974).
129. Id. at 613.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114 (West Pamph. 2011)).
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Even though Texas veil piercing law was evolving in the corporate sector at the time of the LLC Act's enactment, the LLC Act included no
similar provisions. 133 In 2011, the Texas legislature added § 101.002 to address this very issue: it clarified that code sections that regulate veil piercing with respect to corporations also apply to LLCs.134 Because this case
began before the amendment, however, Shook correctly acknowledged
that the case should be governed by former law.135 When the Texas corporation statutes were silent on the issue of veil piercing, Texas courts still
imposed veil piercing on corporations.13 6 Likewise, the court of appeals
recognized that most Texas courts have also treated LLCs in the same
manner-uniformly permitting the piercing of LLCs' veils despite statutory silence-using similar standards as developed in corporate
statutes.' 3 7
Shook pointed out on appeal that the jury instructions failed to describe the requirement that he must have used S & J to perpetrate an
actual fraud for his "direct personal benefit" under both the alter ego and
sham theories.' 38 The Waldens, on the other hand, argued that these standards should not apply to LLCs.139 They argued that the legislature's intentional silence-before 2011-and the inherent differences between
corporations and LLCs meant that the same standards should not apply.140 Instead, they argued that these factors evidenced a legislative intent not to apply the restrictions required for corporate veil piercing in
the LLC context.141
Acknowledging that the Texas Supreme Court had not yet spoken on
the application of veil piercing laws in the LLC context, the court of appeals decided to let the legislative policy judgments and balancing of interests that occurred through legislative amendments post-Castleberry
guide its application of LLC veil piercing law.142 The court highlighted
the Waldens failure to identify any differences between LLCs and corporations in the context of piercing an entity's veil in a contract claim.143
The court instead reasoned that the core inquiry was the same in both
cases: "when should the policies of shielding investors and entrepreneurs
from liability yield to the goal of preventing 'abuse' of the entity's separate existence?"1 44 As a result, the court held that the Waldens had to
prove that Shook used S & J to perpetrate fraud for his direct personal
benefit and that he actually perpetrated the fraud.145 Since the Waldens
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 613-14.
Id. at 614.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 615.
Id.
Id. at 615-16.
Id.
Id. at 617, 620.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id.
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admitted that they did not meet this burden, the court held in favor of
Shook on the veil piercing issue and found him to be not personally

liable. 14 6
Justice Henson dissented, noting that in the absence of legislative direction under the LLC statute, she would have applied Castleberry standards. 14 7 Under Castleberry, no actual fraud finding is necessary, and
therefore, Justice Henson would have upheld the jury's decision that
Shook was liable under either theory. 148
B.

IN RE

JULIET DEBTORS,

LP

In In re Juliet Debtors, LP, a bankruptcy court explored the issue of
reverse veil piercing in the limited partnership context.149 Reverse veil
piercing is similar to traditional veil piercing, but it occurs in reverse:
creditors can reach a corporation's assets for liabilities belonging to an
individualwhen the individual has used the corporation as an alter ego.150
In this bankruptcy case, Chapter 7 trustees of Juliet Homes, LP, Juliet
GP, LLC, and Douglas Brown sued a group of defendants, alleging "preferential transfers, fraudulent transfers under both the Bankruptcy Code
and the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, unjust enrichment, and
legal fees." 15 1 As part of their claims, the trustees also sought to pierce
the corporate veil of entities associated with the Juliet debtors (Juliet
Homes, LP, and Juliet GP, LLC).152
The court held that the trustees avoided dismissal by meeting their burden to plead the elements of a reverse veil piercing claim.153 In contrast
to its treatment of traditional veil piercing, Texas has not codified the
doctrine of reverse veil piercing, the requirements of which are therefore
defined by Texas common law.154 Historically, Texas courts have used reverse veil piercing in order "to bring assets of an affiliated entity into a
bankruptcy estate." 155
Generally, courts have hesitated to use the doctrine in the bankruptcy
context. 156 They have held that the doctrine should only apply "when
there is such a unity between corporation and individual that the separateness of the corporation has ceased and holding only the individual
liable would result in injustice." 57 In general, the court will consider a
146. Id. at 621-22.
147. Id. at 628 (Henson, J., concurring and dissenting).
148. Id. at 630.
149. In re Juliet Homes, LP, No. 07-36424, 2011 WL 6817928, at *18 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
Dec. 28, 2011).
150. Id.
151. Id. at *1.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *19-20.
154. Id. at *18.
155. Id. at *19.
156. See id.
157. Id. (quoting Bollore S.A. v. Imp. Warehouse, Inc., 448 F.3d 317, 325 (5th Cir.
2006)).

1048

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

variety of factors to determine whether to reverse pierce the corporate
veil, including: the relationship between the corporation and individual,
respect for corporate formalities, segregation of corporate and individual
assets, the amount of control and interest that the individual has over the
corporation, and the individual's use of the corporation for personal
gain.158
In this case, the trustees alleged that the non-debtor Juliet entities were
merely alter egos of the debtors and served to perpetrate a fraud on the
bankruptcy estate. 159 The trustees' complaint specifically alleged that:
(1) the debtors formed the entities as a tool to perpetrate their fraud;
(2) the debtors ran the entities for their personal benefit and conducted
business through them; (3) the entities lacked separateness from the debtors by commingling funds and failing to keep corporate and personal assets separate; and (4) Brown perpetrated fraud by diverting company
revenues to render the debtors insolvent.160 The court held that these
specific facts stated a claim for reverse veil piercing under Texas law, in
light of the above-described factors necessary to justify reverse veil piercing. 16 1 As a result, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to adequately plead reverse veil piercing. 162
IV. DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
In Wesolek v. Layton, a federal court in the Southern District of Texas
focused on procedure and clarified the standard necessary for plaintiffs to
bring a derivative action in Texas on behalf of a partnership when they
claim a loss in partnership value.16 3 In this case, a large group of plaintiffs
purchased units of two Texas limited partnerships-Layton Energy
Wharton, LP, and Layton Energy Fund 2, LP (collectively, the Funds)that later greatly decreased in value. 164 Daniel Layton and J. Clarke
Legler operated the Funds through Layton Energy Texas, LLC (Layton
Energy).165 The plaintiffs alleged that both Layton and Legler took
money from the Funds to serve as collateral for other projects that Layton and Legler were operating. 166 Layton frequently induced investors to
invest by promising they would receive a 300-500% return on their investments within three to five years. 167 Around the summer of 2010, Layton avoided investors' inquiries, allowed leases to expire, failed to pay
service providers, failed to comply with state and federal regulations,
failed to acquire properties that he had claimed he would acquire, and
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *20.
Wesolek v. Layton, 871 F. Supp. 2d 620, 626-27 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
Id. at 623, 633.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 624.
Id.
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engaged in general self-dealing that caused harm to the Funds. 168 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that Layton frequently disregarded the separateness of the other businesses involved and the Funds, "treat[ing] them
as a single business enterprise." 1 6 9
Based on these facts, the plaintiffs sued to rescind the sale of their partnership interests and to recover the money that they had invested in the
Funds. 170 The plaintiffs filed a class action suit seeking recovery based on
multiple theories, including fraud, conspiracy, and conversion, in December 2011.171 In response, defendants Layton Corporation, Layton Energy,
Layton, and Legler filed a motion to dismiss. 172 They argued that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims because the injuries that
they complained of occurred solely to the Funds-not to the plaintiffs
individually.173 In January 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint (ACAC) that purported to bring the claims on behalf of
the plaintiffs individually and on behalf of the Funds derivatively.1 7 4
Defendants Layton and Legler sought dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.1 75
Layton and Legler argued that because the claims set forth in the original
petition sought relief for harms that the Funds suffered, the plaintiffs had
no standing to assert these claims. 176 Further, they argued that because
the plaintiffs had no standing in their original petition, the court had
never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction.' 7 7 Therefore, the defendants
argued, the plaintiffs had no right to file their ACAC.1 78 The court sided
with the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; but first it engaged in a thorough analysis of the
current state of the law regarding standing with respect to
partnerships.179
The court explained that the test for standing in Texas requires a real
controversy between the parties that the judicial help sought will resolve. 8 0 The court then clarified that under Texas law, a partnership is a
distinct entity: it can sue and be sued separately from its partners.s'8 Limited partners can bring actions to recover on behalf of the limited partnership only if: "(1) all general partners with authority to bring the action
have refused to bring the action; or (2) an effort to cause those general
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 626-27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 627-29.
Id. at 627-28.
Id. at 628.
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partners to bring the action is not likely to succeed." 182 Limited partners
may choose to bring a cause either in their individual capacity-a direct
claim-or on behalf of the partnership-a derivative claim. 183 The classification of the claim matters because, for the purpose of determining subject-matter jurisdiction, the limited partnership is an indispensable party
in a derivative action. 184 On the other hand, the limited partnership is not
a required party in a direct action.185
The court held that all of the plaintiffs' claims seeking relief for a loss
of investment value must have been brought derivatively on behalf of the
Funds. 186 The court reached this determination after the plaintiffs failed
to provide any authority holding that a loss of value in the Funds would
give them standing to bring the claims directly.187 Instead, the defendants
provided authority demonstrating that Texas law required the plaintiffs to
bring claims for loss of value derivatively.18 8 Specifically, the court considered precedent stating that a loss of value in a limited partnership directly injured the limited partnership, while any loss to a partner resulting
from a decrease in ownership interest was "indirect to and duplicative of"
the injury to the limited partnership. 189
Ultimately, the court reasoned that the Funds were the proper entities
to bring suit.190 Although the plaintiffs attempted to bring a derivative
claim in their amended complaint, the court held that the plaintiffs did
not comply with § 153.403 of the TBOC, which requires that plaintiffs
plead "with particularity" the efforts that they took to request that the
general partner act or why they did not make those efforts. 19 1 Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to comply with Federal Rule 23.1(b), which required them to verify the derivative complaint and disclaim any allusive
intent to qualify for jurisdiction when the court otherwise would not have
jurisdiction.' 92 Although the plaintiffs sought leave to amend their
amended complaint to comply with the requirements, the court rejected
their request.193 The court cited the fact that the plaintiffs did not provide
any indication of the additional facts that they would allege or explain
why they had not alleged them in the first place.194 In sum, the court
95
dismissed the derivative claim asserted for loss of value in the Funds.1
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 629.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 632.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (quoting Nauslar v. Coors Brewing Co., 170 S.W.3d 242, 251 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.)).
190. Id. at 633.
191. Id. at 633-34.
192. Id. at 634 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b)).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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Turning to the plaintiffs' claims for common law fraud and violations of
the Texas Securities Act arising from misrepresentations that occurred
before the plaintiffs purchased their interests in the Funds, the court held
that the plaintiffs could bring these claims directly for personal harm suffered individually, as opposed to harms suffered by the Funds. 196 However, the court still ended up dismissing these claims for failure to plead
with sufficient particularity rather than for lack of standing. 197
This case emphasizes a recurring theme of the Survey period: the importance of careful drafting of court documents and careful compliance
with civil procedure requirements. In this case, a careful study of Texas
law would have revealed that a claim for a loss of value in the Funds
should have been brought derivatively and that even after the complaint
was amended to add a derivative claim, the complaint must also detail
with particularity the actions that were taken to encourage the general
partner to bring the derivative action or why these actions were never
taken. Here, more specificity in the complaint-as well as a better understanding of derivative actions-could have changed the outcome of the
case.
V. LIMITED LIABILITY OF PARTNERS IN LIMITED
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS
In Rhodes Colleges, Inc. v. Johnson, a federal court in the Northern
District of Texas addressed the recent Texas limited liability partnership
statutory amendment from September 2011 that changed the imposition
of personal liability on partners of a limited liability partnership.' 9 8 The
court applied earlier Texas law because the plaintiff's claim arose before
the enactment of the new statute.199 The plaintiff, Rhodes Colleges, Inc.
(d/b/a Everest College) sued Van Wey & Johnson, LLP (VW & J), as well
as the lawyers who were partners in the firm in their individual capacities,
Julie E. Johnson and Kay L. Van Wey, asserting claims of common law
libel per se, statutory libel per se, business disparagement, and tortious
interference with contract. 200
Johnson's legal practice focused heavily on education fraud, and she
had multiple clients who engaged her to bring fraud actions against Everest College. 20 1 In January 2009, she received her first education fraud
cases against Everest College. 202 In response, she updated the firm's website content to include statements about Everest College that alluded to
education fraud.20 3 The website contained such comments as: (1) "When
196. Id. at 636.
197. Id.
198. Rhodes Colls., Inc. v. Johnson, No. 3:10-CV-0031-D, 2012 WL 627273, at *7 & n.7
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2012).
199. Id.
200. Id. at *1-2.
201. Id. at *1.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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schools promise far more than they can possibly deliver, that's educational fraud. At the [VW & J] law firm in Dallas, our attorneys have
represented hundreds of students in confronting educational fraud at Everest College and other for-profit educational institutions," and (2)
When the lawyers at [VW & J] began getting calls from students at
Everest College, we began to investigate. Everest College was promising to prepare students for lucrative careers. The truth was far different. The school is not accredited. They are in the education
business for one reason-to make a profit. 204
The website also accused the school of misrepresenting job placement
facts and having students spend time and money on programs that would
not transfer to other schools. 205 In May 2009, Van Wey and Johnson
parted ways, and each formed individual laws firms-Van Wey Law,
P.L.L.C (VWL), and the Law Office of Julie Johnson, P.L.L.C. (LOJJ),
respectively-and Johnson transferred the website content to her own
firm website. 206
In response to the website content, Everest filed this lawsuit against
Johnson, Van Wey, VW & J, LOJJ, and VWL, alleging common-law libel
per se, statutory libel per se, business disparagement, and tortious interference with contract. 207 Van Wey and VWL moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them. 208 In a footnote, the court
recognized the defendants' argument that Van Wey was not personally
liable under the new Texas statute, effective as of September 1, 2011, that
eliminates all exceptions to the general rule that partners in limited liability partnerships cannot be personally liable for the partnership's debts. 209
Because the amendment was not expressly retroactive, however, the
court held that this statute could not govern because Everest's claims
arose before the enactment of the statute. 2 10
Instead, the court turned to Texas law in effect at the time of the allegedly defamatory statements to determine whether Van Wey was personally liable for a debt or obligation of the partnership. 211 The court
explained that under § 152.801 of the TBOC, a partner is not liable for
another partner's negligence unless that partner:
(1) was supervising or directing the other partner or representative
when the error, omission, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance
was committed by the other partner or representative; (2) was directly involved in the specific activity in which the error, omission,
negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance was committed by the
other partner or representative; or (3) had notice or knowledge of
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
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Id. at
Id.
Id. at
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the error, omission, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance by the
other partner or representative at the time of the occurrence and
then failed to take reasonable action to prevent or cure the error,
omission, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance. 2 1 2
Van Wey neither supervised nor directed Johnson when Johnson made
the decision to post the statements about Everest College on the VW & J
website. 213 Van Wey did not monitor the website, and Van Wey did not
know that the Everest content was on the site prior to this lawsuit.2 14
Everest provided no evidence that presented a fact issue on any of the
liability exceptions listed in § 152.801 of the TBOC, and the court therefore granted summary judgment in Van Wey's favor.2 15
The court also granted summary judgment in VWL's favor because
VWL's website never contained the allegedly defamatory content.2 16
VI. CONCLUSION
On the whole, the cases from this Survey period reflect the recurring
theme that compliance with civil procedure is very important to a case's
outcome and that lawyers must exercise the utmost care in drafting court
documents to reach favorable outcomes. The cases from this Survey period also emphasize the importance of well-negotiated and well-drafted
LLC and partnership agreements, especially since courts have demonstrated the unwavering weight they will give to the agreement's terms.
Further, the cases from the Survey period express a possible newfound
ease with which courts may impose fiduciary duties on limited partners in
limited partnerships in the future. The cases also shed light on the current
state of the law regarding veil piercing and reverse veil piercing. Given
the recent changes to the TBOC that courts discussed briefly during this
Survey period, involving personal liability of partners in partnerships and
members in LLCs, the next Survey period should contain cases that provide even more in-depth analysis of these provisions.

212.
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